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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Robert Fleisher, D.M.D., filed suit against the 
Standard Insurance Company (“Standard”), alleging, inter 
alia, a violation of § 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  The suit arises out of Standard’s 
decision to reduce Fleisher’s monthly long-term disability 
(“LTD”) benefits by the amount of the monthly benefits he 
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receives under a separate LTD insurance policy issued to him 
by the North American Company for Life and Health 
Insurance (“North American”).  Fleisher disputes Standard’s 
decision that the North American Policy constitutes “group 
insurance coverage,” and that the monthly payment he 
receives under that Policy is therefore “Deductible Income” 
under the Standard Policy.  The District Court, applying the 
deferential abuse of discretion standard of review, granted 
Standard’s motion to dismiss.  Specifically, it found that 
Standard’s determination to offset the North American 
monthly benefit of $1,500 from Standard’s monthly 
obligation of $10,000 is supported by substantial evidence 
and not unreasonable.  Fleisher now appeals this decision.  
For the reasons stated herein, we will affirm the decision of 
the District Court. 
I.  
 During the course of his career as a dentist, Fleisher 
obtained LTD insurance coverage under two separate 
policies.  In July 1979, Fleisher obtained coverage under a 
policy issued by North American (“North American Policy”) 
to the American Association of Endodontics (“AAE”), of 
which Fleisher is a member.  The North American Policy 
provides for LTD benefits of $1,500 per month. 
 In August 2002, Fleisher became eligible for LTD 
insurance coverage under a group policy issued by Standard 
(“Standard Policy”) to his employer, Endodontics, Ltd., P.C. 
(“Endodontics”).  The LTD coverage offered by Fleisher’s 
employer is an employee benefit governed by ERISA.  See 
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 91 n. 5 (1983) (“An 
‘employee welfare benefit plan’ [governed by ERISA] 
includes any program that provides benefits for contingencies 
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such as illness, accident, disability, death, or 
unemployment.”).  The Standard Policy provides for monthly 
LTD benefits equal to a percentage of the plan participant’s 
pre-disability earnings, which in Fleisher’s case was a 
maximum of “$10,000 before reduction by Deductible 
Income.”  (A. 61.)  The Policy defines “Deductible Income” 
to include “[a]ny amount you [a plan participant] receive or 
are eligible to receive because of your disability under 
another group insurance coverage.”  (A. 72) (emphasis 
added).  The Standard Policy excludes from “Deductible 
Income” benefits paid under “any individual disability 
insurance policy.”  (A. 72.)  The Policy does not define either 
“another group insurance coverage” or “individual disability 
insurance policy.” 
 In January 2008, Fleisher became disabled and 
claimed LTD benefits under both  
the Standard and the North American policies.  Shortly after 
Fleisher began collecting under both policies, Standard 
reduced his monthly benefits from $10,000 to $8,500 based 
on its determination that the North American Policy 
constitutes “another group insurance coverage,” and that the 
$1,500 in benefits he receives under it is therefore 
“Deductible Income.”  Fleisher filed an administrative appeal 
of Standard’s decision, arguing that the North American 
Policy qualifies as an individual disability insurance policy, 
and therefore is not subject to deduction.  By letter dated July 
11, 2008, Standard rejected Fleisher’s appeal and continued 
making the deduction. 
 On May 26, 2010 Fleisher filed a Complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
asserting individual and class claims for wrongful denial of 
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benefits under ERISA, along with various state law claims.  
After Standard moved to dismiss the Complaint, Fleisher filed 
an Amended Complaint on September 8, 2010.  After 
Standard moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, Fleisher 
filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on October 1, 
2010.1
 Standard moved to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On May 2, 2011, the District Court 
granted Standard’s motion.  The District Court initially 
concluded that the benefits offset determination was governed 
by “the deferential abuse of discretion standard.”  (A. 14.)  
Applying that narrow standard of review, the Court held that 
Fleisher could not show that Standard’s decision reflected an 
unreasonable interpretation or application of the Standard 
Policy.  The District Court recognized that there was a 
conflict of interest arising from the fact that Standard both 
paid benefits and made the offset decision, and that such a 
conflict had to be considered in deciding whether Standard 
had abused its discretion.  It concluded, however, that 
Standard’s interpretation of pertinent policy provisions was 
not so close as to make the conflict of interest a determinative 
factor.  The Court also dismissed Fleisher’s § 502(a)(3) 
claims for breaches of fiduciary duty and contract, concluding 
that Standard’s conduct was not improper. 
  The SAC asserts three ERISA claims: breaches of 
fiduciary duty (Count I) and contract (Count III), both 
pursuant to § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), and breach of 
contract pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B) (Count II).  The SAC 
seeks restitution for the deductions previously taken as well 
as injunctive relief to govern future deduction decisions.   
                                                          
1Although Fleisher filed the SAC without obtaining 
leave of the Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, the Court 
dismissed the SAC on the merits pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 
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II.  
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district 
court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  
Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 
(3d Cir. 2009).  Accordingly, we must “‘accept all factual 
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief.’”  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)).  To survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
allegations, taken as true, to “state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 
1949 (2009) (holding that the plausibility pleading standard 
articulated in Twombly applies to all civil actions). 
III.  
 Fleisher’s coverage under the Standard Policy, an 
employee welfare benefit plan, is governed by ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq.  Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA 
creates a civil cause of action for a plan participant “to 
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to 
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his 
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”  To 
assert a claim under this provision, a plan participant must 
demonstrate that “he or she . . . ha[s] a right to benefits that is 
legally enforceable against the plan,” and that the plan 
administrator improperly denied those benefits.  Hooven v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 465 F.3d 566, 574 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
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SAC alleges that Standard “breached its obligations under 
ERISA to Dr. Fleisher . . . by taking a deduction to which it 
was not entitled and thus unreasonably failing to pay those 
benefits in full.”  (A. 140-41.) 
 In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 
101, 115 (1989), the Supreme Court held: 
[A] denial of benefits challenged under [§ 
502(a)(1)(B)] is to be reviewed under a de novo 
standard unless the benefit plan gives the 
administrator or fiduciary discretionary 
authority to determine eligibility for benefits or 
to construe the terms of the plan. 
When a plan grants its administrator such discretionary 
authority, “[t]rust principles make a deferential standard of 
review appropriate,” id. at 111, and “we review a denial of 
benefits under an ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard.”  
Orvosh v. Program of Group Ins. for Salaried Emps. of 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 222 F.3d 123, 129 (3d Cir. 2000).2
                                                          
2 We have clarified that “[i]n the ERISA context, the 
arbitrary and capricious and abuse of discretion standards of 
review are essentially identical.”  Miller v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 
632 F.3d 837, 845 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Howley v. 
Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 793 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010)).  
Accordingly, we use the phrases “abuse of discretion” and 
“arbitrary and capricious” interchangeably when referring to 
the deferential standard of review applicable in this case. 
  
Likewise, when an administrator acts pursuant to her 
authority “to construe the terms of the plan,” Critzer v. CBS, 
Inc., 275 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2002) or “to act as a finder of 
facts,” Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 438 (3d 
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Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by 
Miller v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 632 F.3d 837, 847 (3d Cir. 2011), 
we also apply the arbitrary and capricious standard when 
reviewing those interpretations and factual findings. 
 “An administrator’s decision is arbitrary and 
capricious ‘if it is without reason, unsupported by substantial 
evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.’”  Miller, 632 F.3d 
at 845 (quoting Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 
40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  An 
administrator’s interpretation is not arbitrary if it is 
“reasonably consistent with unambiguous plan language.”  
Bill Gray Enters. v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 218 (3d Cir. 
2001).  When a plan’s language is ambiguous and the 
administrator is authorized to interpret it, courts “must defer 
to this interpretation unless it is arbitrary or capricious.”  
McElroy v. SmithKline Beecham Health & Welfare Benefits 
Trust Plan, 340 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2003).  “The 
determination of whether a term is ambiguous is a question of 
law.  A term is ambiguous if it is subject to reasonable 
alternative interpretations.”  Taylor v. Cont’l Group Change 
in Control Severance Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 1227, 1233 (3d Cir. 
1991) (citations omitted). 
 Courts defer to an administrator’s findings of facts 
when they are supported by “substantial evidence,” which we 
have “defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Soubik v. 
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 366 F.3d 226, 233 
(3d Cir. 2004).  When reviewing an administrator’s factual 
determinations, we consider only the “evidence that was 
before the administrator when he made the decision being 
reviewed.”  Mitchell, 113 F.3d at 440. The Standard Policy 
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vests the administrator with: “[F]ull and exclusive authority 
to control and manage the Group Policy, to administer claims, 
and to interpret the Group Policy and resolve any questions 
arising in the administration, interpretation, and application of 
the Group Policy.”  (A. 79.)  This language clearly triggers 
application of the deferential abuse of discretion standard of 
review.  See Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45, abrogated on other 
grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 112 
(2008).   
 In the District Court, Fleisher argued that Standard’s 
decision is not entitled to arbitrary and capricious review, 
asserting that this deferential standard only applies to an 
administrator’s interpretation of documents that are part of 
the plan itself.  Because Standard’s deduction decision was 
based in part on its finding that the North American Policy—
a non-plan document—constituted “group insurance 
coverage,” Fleisher reasoned that de novo review is 
appropriate. 
 We rejected a similar argument in Mitchell, in which a 
plan administrator denied Mitchell’s claim for benefits based 
on a factual finding about his eligibility, rather than on an 
interpretation of the terms of the plan.  113 F.3d at 438.  The 
plan vested the administrator with “full discretionary 
authority to determine all questions arising in the 
administration, interpretation and application of the plan.”  Id.  
We held that this “broad grant of discretionary authority to 
the Administrator” to apply the plan “must encompass the 
resolution of factual disputes,” because such “fact-based 
determinations of eligibility for LTD benefits are certainly 
one of the ‘questions arising in the administration, 
interpretation and application of the plan.’”  Id. at 438-39. 
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 The District Court relied on our reasoning in Mitchell 
in rejecting Fleisher’s argument for de novo review.  The 
Court found that the Standard Policy grants the administrator 
discretionary authority over “application” of the Policy, 
which includes the authority to “interpret the plan and make 
findings of fact necessary to determine eligibility.”  (A. 14.)  
Accordingly, the Court reviewed Standard’s deduction 
decision—including its “interpretation and characterization of 
the North American Policy”—under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard.   
 Fleisher apparently reasserts his challenges to this 
deferential standard now, declaring: “On appeal, this Court 
reviews the plan administrator’s denial of benefits by 
applying the standard of review the district court should have 
used initially.”  (Appellant Br. at 12, citing Mitchell, 113 F.3d 
at 437; Dewitt v. Penn-Del Directory Corp., 106 F.3d 514, 
519 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997)).  Fleisher, however, offers no further 
argument to support this apparent challenge, and we discern 
no error with the District Court’s determination that the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies here.  We 
will therefore apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review to Standard’s denial of benefits, including its 
determination about the North American Policy.3
                                                          
3 As our dissenting colleague observes, the conflict of 
interest inherent in the fact that Standard both pays and 
decides what should be paid is a factor to be considered in 
applying the abuse of discretion standard of review.  It is not, 
however, inherently a determinative factor.  See Glenn, 554 
U.S. at 117-19.  Indeed, “the existence of a conflict,” such as 
the one in this case, “[does] not change the standard of review 
from abuse of discretion to a more searching review.”  
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IV. 
 The Standard Policy permits it to reduce Fleisher’s 
monthly LTD benefits by any amount paid or payable under 
“another group insurance coverage.”  At issue here is the 
meaning of “group insurance” and whether Standard 
reasonably determined that the North American Policy falls 
within the meaning of this term.  In this regard, Standard’s 
determination involved both an interpretation of “group 
insurance” and a factual determination about the North 
American Policy.   
 The District Court recognized, and the parties do not 
dispute, that the term “group insurance” is ambiguous.  The 
Court consulted various insurance law treatises and found that 
insurers use the term “group insurance” to refer to “at least 
two subsets of collective insurance products,” including “true 
group insurance” and “franchise insurance.”  (A. 17.)  The 
Court explained a basic difference between the two: 
Group insurance is an arrangement by which a 
single insurance policy is issued to a central 
                                                                                                                                  
Doroshow v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 230, 
234 (3d Cir. 2009).  Instead, we are to “apply a deferential 
abuse of discretion standard of review across the board and 
consider any conflict of interest as one of several factors in 
considering whether the administrator or the fiduciary abused 
its discretion.”  Est. of Schwing v. Lilly Health Plan, 562 F.3d 
522, 525 (3d Cir. 2009).  While our dissenting colleague 
expounds at great length on the significance of the conflict of 
interest in this case, Fleisher does not even mention this factor 
in his briefs on appeal, let alone explain how it affects the 
analysis of his claim.   
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entity—commonly an employer, association, or 
union—for coverage of the individual members 
of the group.  Franchise insurance is a variation 
on group insurance, in which all members of the 
group receive individual policies. 
(A. 17, quoting Couch on Insurance § 1:29 (3d ed. 2002)). 
 The District Court also identified other distinguishing 
features of the two types of group policies.  Under true group 
insurance policies, the certificate holder is typically an 
employee of the master policy holder, “all members or 
employees are automatically enrolled,” and the master policy 
holder works directly with the insurer and is responsible for 
paying premiums, notifying the insurer about changes 
concerning which persons are covered at a given time, and 
submitting members’ claims.  (A. 17, citing Appleman on 
Insurance Law & Practice §§ 41, 54 (rev. ed. 1981) 
(“Appleman”)). 
 Franchise insurance is also issued through a group 
which holds the master policy that provides for the general 
terms.  While the master policy holder and insurer “‘may 
negotiate’ with the insurer to modify or terminate the plan, in 
all other respects the relationship between members and the 
insurer is ‘precisely that of an insurer dealing directly with its 
policyholders.’”  (A. 18, quoting Appleman § 54.)  As the 
District Court explained: 
[F]ranchise insurance generally has the 
following characteristics: (1) members of the 
relevant association or entity may enroll in the 
plan but are not required to do so; (2) members 
pay premiums directly to the insurer; (3) 
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members make claims directly to the insurer; 
and (4) insurers agree to “waive underwriting, 
and take all applicants across the board.” 
(A. 18, quoting Appleman § 54.) 
 Therefore, “[a]lthough true group insurance and 
franchise insurance are distinct products,” the District Court 
found that, “‘lawyers, legal writers, publishers, and the courts 
can refer to them individually and collectively as “group 
insurance.”’”  (A. 18, citing Holmes’ Appleman on Insurance 
§ 2.5 (2d ed. 2002)).  On this basis, the Court concluded that 
the term “group insurance” is ambiguous because it “may 
reasonably refer to at least two different types of collective 
insurance products.”  (A. 19.) 
 Our dissenting colleague, relying upon “general 
principles of contract law,” (Dissenting Op. at 4), suggests 
that we should apply the well-established principle that 
ambiguous terms in an insurance policy “must be construed 
most strongly against the insurance company that drafted it.”  
(Id. at 3).  He vigorously asserts that our review must be 
“informed both by [such] general principles of contract law 
and by ERISA’s purposes as manifested in its specific 
provisions.”  (Id. at 4, quoting Burstein v. Retirement Account 
Plan for Emp. Of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research 
Found., 334 F.3d 365, 385 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added by 
Judge Garth) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)).  The dissent argues that the result here is 
inequitable because “the Standard Policy to which Dr. 
Fleisher subscribed at no time alerted him to its deductible 
provisions, nor did Standard offer an interpretation of those 
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provisions so that a layperson such as Dr. Fleisher could 
assess the protection that he was seeking.”4  (Id.
 With all due respect to our dissenting colleague, we 
think that he misapprehends the nature of the abuse of 
discretion standard of review.  Notably, the case he cites for 
applying general principles of contract law to interpret 
ERISA plan terms, Burstein, 334 F.3d 365, did not involve 
review of a benefits determination under an abuse of 
discretion standard, but instead concerned a conflict between 
a summary plan description and the plan document itself.  
And while we have applied the doctrine of contra 
proferentem in the context of ERISA claims, we have done so 
only to decide whether the plan documents confer 
discretionary authority on the plan administrator so as to 
trigger deferential review, a decision we make under a 
plenary standard of review.  See, e.g., Heasley v. Belden & 
Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1254, 1257-58 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Where, however, the abuse of discretion standard applies, we 
have made clear that we must defer to the plan 
administrator’s interpretation of ambiguous plan terms unless 
that interpretation is arbitrary or capricious.  See McElroy 340 
F.3d at 143 (“Because the language of the . . . Plan is 
equivocal, the plan administrator was authorized to interpret 
it, and we must defer to this interpretation unless it is 
arbitrary or capricious.”).   
 at 3-4.) 
                                                          
4 It bears mentioning that the record before this Court 
does not include an actual insurance policy, but does include 
the ERISA Summary Plan Description (“SPD”) for the 
disability coverage provided by Standard.  The dissent is 
correct that the SPD does not describe its deductible 
provisions in large block lettering or in any other way that 
would call a reader’s attention to this specific provision. 
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 The dissent’s application of the contra proferentem 
doctrine would supplant deference to an administrator’s 
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous terms with a 
presumption that such an interpretation is unreasonable.  In 
addition to undermining the established deferential standard, 
contrary to Supreme Court authority, such an approach also 
eviscerates the provision of the Standard Policy which 
granted the administrator discretion in the first place.  Indeed, 
the administrator can hardly be said to exercise discretion if 
her interpretations of the policy’s terms is burdened by a 
presumption against the insurer.  
 Notably, every Court of Appeals to have addressed the 
issue has concluded that a court reviewing a benefits decision 
for abuse of discretion cannot apply the principle that 
ambiguous plan terms are construed against the party that 
drafted the plan.  See, e.g., D & H Therapy Assoc., LLC v. 
Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 640 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(“We have emphasized that our review of whether a plan 
administrator abused its discretion does not require that we 
determine either the ‘best reading’ of the ERISA plan or how 
we would read the plan de novo. We have also noted that the 
doctrine of contra proferentem does not apply to review of an 
ERISA plan construction advanced by an administrator given 
authority to construe the plan.”) (citations omitted); Marrs v. 
Motorola, Inc., 577 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“[A]lthough, generally, ambiguities in an insurance policy 
are construed in favor of an insured, in the ERISA context in 
which a plan administrator has been empowered to interpret 
the terms of the plan, this rule does not obtain.”) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted); Carden v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 559 
F.3d 256, 260-61 (4th Cir. 2009); White v. Coca-Cola Co., 
542 F.3d 848, 857 (11th Cir. 2008); Lennon v. Metro. Life 
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Ins. Co., 504 F.3d 617, 627 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007); Kimber v. 
Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1100-01 (10th Cir. 1999); 
Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 F.3d 550, 554 (9th 
Cir. 1995); Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 443-
44 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A]pplication of the rule of contra 
proferentum is limited to those occasions in which this Court 
reviews an ERISA plan de novo.”).  District Courts in our 
Circuit also have recognized that the doctrine of contra 
proferentem does not apply where, as here, judicial review is 
constrained by the abuse of discretion standard.  See, e.g., 
Brown v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 2011 WL 
1044664, at *16, n.13 (W.D. Pa. 2011); Doe v. Hartford Life 
& Accident Ins. Co., 2008 WL 5400984, at *4 (D. N.J. 2008). 
 The dissenting opinion reads as if we were interpreting 
an ambiguous term in an insurance policy under a de novo 
standard of review.  It alludes to notions of contracts of 
adhesion and reasonable expectations of the insured that 
populate cases interpreting insurance policies in the first 
instance.  Those concepts are simply not applicable where, as 
here, the ERISA plan document makes the plan administrator 
the competent authority to interpret ambiguous plan 
provisions in the first instance.  See Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1101 
(“[T]he reasonable expectation doctrine is inapplicable to the 
review of an ERISA disability benefits plan under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard.”).  As Judge Cudahy 
explained in Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867, 871 n.1 (7th Cir. 
1996): 
Courts invoke [the contra proferentem] rule 
when they have the authority to construe the 
terms of a plan, but this authority arises only 
when the administrators of the plan lack the 
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discretion to construe it themselves. . . . When 
the administrators of a plan have discretionary 
authority to construe the plan, they have the 
discretion to determine the intended meaning of 
the plan’s terms. In making a deferential review 
of such determinations, courts have no occasion 
to employ the rule of contra proferentem. 
Deferential review does not involve a 
construction of the terms of the plan; it involves 
a more abstract inquiry—the construction of 
someone else's construction.  
(internal citations omitted.) 
 Ultimately, we think Judge Garth is mistaken 
inasmuch as he implies that Fleisher has somehow been the 
victim of a contract of adhesion, or that he was otherwise 
misled by Standard.  Although the Standard Policy did not 
define the terms “group insurance” or “individual insurance” 
or reference the term “franchise insurance,” it reposed in the 
administrator the authority to interpret ambiguous terms.  
Thus, we are not concerned that plan participants like 
Fleisher—or, as Judge Garth suggests, sophisticated plan 
participants like the judges on this panel—are misled by 
insurance policies such as Standard’s.  Since the Standard 
Policy vested the administrator with discretion to interpret the 
Policy, under our well-established case law we have no 
option but to uphold this interpretation unless it is arbitrary or 
capricious.  As our dissenting colleague observed in another 
ERISA case, “a court must actually apply the correct standard 
[of review]; mere lipservice and mere citation to a standard of 
review will not suffice.”  Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life 
Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 399 (3d Cir. 2003) (Garth, J., 
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dissenting).  In this case, application of the deferential 
standard of review precludes reliance upon the general 
principles of contract law on which the dissent rests.  Whether 
we would reach a different interpretation under de novo 
review is therefore irrelevant. 
 Having established that “group insurance” is 
ambiguous and that the Standard administrator is authorized 
to interpret it, the District Court evaluated the features of the 
North American Policy to determine whether Standard could 
reasonably interpret it as a type of group insurance coverage.  
The Court observed several features of the North American 
Policy consistent with franchise insurance, including that the 
Policy was “issued through a group, [the AAE], whose 
members could individually apply for coverage,” and that 
“the members otherwise interacted directly with the North 
American regarding coverage and premiums.”  (A. 19.)  The 
Court also noted that “the Certificate, which [Fleisher] 
attaches to the Complaint, clearly states that it is issued 
pursuant and subject to ‘group policy PG A320,’ which is 
held by AAE, and that [Fleisher] obtained the Certificate as a 
member of the AAE.”  (A. 19.)  The Court acknowledged 
Fleisher’s argument that the Policy “bears certain features 
characteristic of individual insurance policies,” but concluded 
that the Policy can nonetheless be “reasonably characterized 
as a franchise policy.”  (A. 19).  On this basis, the Court 
dismissed Fleisher’s § 502(a)(1)(B) claim. 
 Fleisher challenges this conclusion on appeal, urging 
that Standard’s determination is unreasonable because it is 
based on a factual finding—that the North American Policy is 
franchise insurance—that is not supported by the evidence.  
Instead, Fleisher contends that the evidence supports the 
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conclusion that the Policy “is an individual disability 
insurance policy with all the characteristics of an individual 
disability insurance policy and none of the characteristics of a 
group insurance policy.”  (Appellant Br. at 21.) 
 First, Fleisher notes that unlike franchise insurance, 
where “insurers agree to ‘waive underwriting, and take all 
applicants across the board,’” (A. 18), the North American 
Policy “was subject to individual underwriting.”  (Appellant 
Br. at 19.)  In this respect, he cites portions of the SAC that 
allege that he was “required to complete a medical 
questionnaire as part of his application” for the North 
American Policy, and that the application “itself indicates that 
North American ordered a Retail Credit Report,” and stated 
that the underwriting procedure may entail “an investigative 
consumer report.”  (Id.
 The District Court did not suggest—nor do any of the 
treatises it cited indicate—that waiver of underwriting is a 
sine qua non of franchise insurance.  Rather, the Court listed 
waiver of underwriting as one of four characteristics that 
franchise insurance “generally has.”  (A. 18.)  Moreover, the 
relevant inquiry is whether Standard’s interpretation is 
supported by “substantial evidence,” which does not require 
that the evidence uniformly supports its conclusion, but 
merely requires “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Soubik, 
366 F.3d at 233.  The District Court correctly found that 
Standard’s interpretation is supported by substantial evidence, 
including that the North American Policy possesses the other 
general features of franchise insurance, that it was issued to 
Fleisher through his membership in a group, and that it states 
that it is a “group policy.”  Thus, the fact that the North 
 at 19-20.) 
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American Policy lacks one feature of franchise insurance 
does not outweigh the other evidence in support of Standard’s 
interpretation. 
 Fleisher next argues that the evidence supports a 
finding that the North American Policy is an individual 
disability insurance policy, and therefore excluded from the 
definition of “Deductible Income” under Standard’s Policy.  
In this regard, Fleisher enumerates six features of the North 
American Policy that, he claims, it shares in common with 
individual policies, including: (1) it is individually 
underwritten; (2) members pay premiums directly; (3) 
members enroll directly; (4) members submit claims directly; 
(5) members receive individual billing statements; and (6) it 
is non-cancellable and guaranteed renewable. 
 The fact that the Policy shares features in common 
with individual disability insurance policies is not necessarily 
inconsistent with a finding that the Policy is franchise 
insurance.  Indeed, three facets of the Policy that Fleisher 
cites as evidence of an individual policy—direct payment of 
premiums, direct enrollment, and direct submission of 
claims—are among those that the District Court identified as 
characteristics of franchise insurance.  Thus, Fleisher’s 
argument that the Policy has “none of the characteristics of a 
group insurance policy” is plainly untrue, as these three 
features in fact support the conclusion that the Policy is 
franchise insurance, which itself is a type of group insurance.5
                                                          
5 To the extent that Fleisher attempts to demonstrate 
that the Policy is not “true” group insurance, this argument is 
unavailing.  Fleisher has conceded that the term “group 
insurance” is ambiguous, and that “franchise insurance” is a 
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 Moreover, as the District Court aptly observed, even 
accepting that the Policy possesses some features of 
individual policies, it “is certainly not a pure individual policy 
because it plainly states that it was issued pursuant to a group 
policy held by AAE.”  (A. 16-17.)  Indeed, there are several 
features of individual policies that the North American Policy 
does not possess.  Notably, unlike individual policies, 
Fleisher has only a certificate of coverage, which is expressly 
subject to the terms of the group policy and to termination of 
the group policy, as well as numerous other conditions 
determined by the holder of the group policy.  (Appellee Br. 
at 12-13.)   
 Finally, Fleisher argues that the District Court 
“ignored the most compelling evidence that the North 
American Policy is an individual rather than a group policy, 
Reassure America’s own characterization of the policy it sold 
to Dr. Fleisher.”  (Appellant Br. at 22.)  The SAC alleges that 
in his administrative appeal of the deduction decision, 
Fleisher submitted a letter from Ken Selasky, the Assistant 
Vice President at Reassure America, which administers the 
North American Policy.  Selasky’s letter states: “[E]ven 
though this policy was issued through this group [referring to 
AAE], it is an individual income policy and we are treating 
all aspects of Dr. Fleisher’s claim as an individual disability 
income policy.”  (Appellant Br. at 22.) 
 While the opinion of the administrator of the North 
American Policy as to the nature of the policy is not 
                                                                                                                                  
type of “group insurance.”  Therefore, the relevant inquiry is 
whether there is substantial evidence that the Policy is 
franchise insurance.  The question whether it is “true” group 
insurance is irrelevant. 
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immaterial, we do not consider it sufficiently persuasive to 
establish that Standard’s contrary interpretation was 
unreasonable.  Indeed, under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review, the relevant inquiry is not whether it is 
reasonable to interpret the North American Policy as an 
individual insurance policy, but whether it is unreasonable to 
interpret it as group insurance.  We conclude that this 
determination is not unreasonable: the North American Policy 
exhibits several characteristic features of franchise insurance, 
which is a species of group insurance, and Fleisher’s 
arguments to the contrary do not undermine the sufficiency of 
this evidence.6
                                                          
6 As noted above, the dissent makes much of a point 
not argued by Fleisher in his principal brief or in his reply 
brief:  the conflict of interest arising from the fact that 
Standard benefits from its decision to set off the North 
American payment of $1,500 per month from the Standard’s 
monthly obligation of $10,000.  The type of conflict here is 
not uncommon.  See Marrs, 577 F.3d at 789 (“[A] conflict of 
interest . . . is a given in almost all ERISA claims”.).  We 
have recognized that a conflict may be determinative where 
the issue is close.  See Est. of Schwing, 562 F.3d at 526.  We 
agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the issue in 
this case is not so close as to make the conflict a tiebreaking 
factor.  Franchise insurance is a species of group insurance, 
Fleisher procured coverage through a group, the coverage he 
obtained had a number of features of franchise insurance, and 
he received only a certificate of insurance, not a policy.  It 
plainly was not unreasonable to consider the North American 
Policy group insurance, and the conflict of interest does not 
alter this conclusion. 
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V.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s decision dismissing this action. 
1 
 
No. 11-2490 
Fleisher v. Standard Insurance Co. 
GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 While I have no quarrel with the majority’s statutory analyses, I reach a different 
result and, therefore, respectfully dissent.  
 I have looked beneath the surface of the principles upon which the majority rely, 
to the fair and equitable roots of this controversy with Standard.  As a result, I would 
remand this case to the District Court to explore and determine the equitable factors in 
play, as well as the conflict and ambiguities that have resulted in a complete frustration of 
Dr. Fleisher’s objectives and expectations.   
 Dr. Fleisher, a dentist specializing in endodontistry, in an effort to protect his 
future earning capacity, subscribed to a North American Disability Policy in 1979.  He 
was to receive a benefit of $1,500 a month.  At that time, he was not disabled, but he was 
aware of the possibility that he might be in future years.  Accordingly, when he became 
eligible for a group policy, he subscribed to one written by the Standard Insurance 
Company.  This was some 23 years after he had subscribed to his initial disability policy 
with North American.  His later subscription to the Standard policy was obviously to 
protect and augment his financial livelihood, by insuring that he had increased protection 
in the event he became disabled. 
 In January 2008, he became disabled and claimed the benefits under both policies, 
Standard, for the first time, informed him that he could not receive the $10,000 a month 
which was the amount of the policy which he had taken out.  Why?  Because the 1979 
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policy to which he had originally subscribed was, in Standard’s opinion, a “group policy” 
and, as such, the amount of the benefits which Dr. Fleisher could receive from the 
Standard policy was reduced by the amount of the North American policy benefit that he 
would henceforth receive. 
 Accordingly, at this time, Dr. Fleisher, who is no longer eligible for disability 
benefits from any company and can no longer subscribe for disability protection, is 
remitted to $10,000 a month, rather than $11,500 a month, the sum total of both policies 
which he had taken out. 
 Why should this be, when the Standard policy at no time brought to Dr. Fleisher’s 
attention the deductibility provision of the Standard policy, nor did it acquaint him with 
any definitions of  the terms:  “group policy”, “ individual policy”, or “franchise 
policies”? 
 All members of the majority and I (as well as the District Court judge) agree that 
the terms and language of the Standard Insurance policy are ambiguous.  Nowhere in the 
Standard policy are the terms “group insurance” and “individual insurance” defined.  No 
matter how diligently one may look at or study the Standard policy, there is no guidance 
to help the policyholder determine the characteristics of either type of policy or how these 
characteristics would affect the benefits that Dr. Fleisher expected to receive. 
Moreover, although the District Court and the majority here have focused their 
analysis on “franchise policies,” and have detailed the characteristics of a “franchise 
policy,” neither the Standard policy nor the individual policy that Dr. Fleisher originally 
purchased, even mention, much less define, the term “franchise policy.”  Yet the 
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characteristics and definition of a “franchise policy” dominate and control the holding of 
both the District Court opinion and the majority opinion here. 
 “Franchise policies” were never described in any insurance document that Dr. 
Fleisher had received, but are rather a matter of characterization that can be found only in 
an insurance treatise such as Appleman’s. 
 As to the characterization of the individual and group policies, there was no 
warning or alert given to Dr. Fleisher which could send up a red flag warning that  he 
should not purchase the Standard policy with its deductible provisions or that if he did, he 
would not achieve the disability benefits that he sought to receive.  (See footnote 1, 
supra.)  In other contexts, our society has taken great pains to alert consumers of products 
detrimental to their well-being: warnings appear in large letters in the advertisements and 
on the packaging of tobacco, drugs, and alcohol.  Large block lettering or other emphatic 
warnings on the Standard policy might have alerted Dr. Fleisher to the problem that he 
now faces. 
 It is well established that when the language of an insurance policy is ambiguous, 
that language must be construed most strongly against the insurance company that 
drafted it.  American Legacy Foundation, R.P. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 623 F.3d 
135, 139 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. 
Co.
In the present case, the Standard policy to which Dr. Fleisher subscribed at no time 
alerted him to its deductible provisions, nor did Standard offer an interpretation of those 
provisions so that a layperson such as Dr. Fleisher could assess the protection that he was 
, 616 A.2d 1192, 1195-96 (Del. 1992)). 
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seeking.  Further, as I have emphasized, the Standard policy makes no mention of the 
status or even the nature of a “franchise policy,” a characterization which governs the 
District Court’s and the majority decisions.   
 The mere fact that this case implicates ERISA does not mean that these basic 
fundamental contract principles should be ignored.  “In interpreting plan terms for 
purposes of claims under § 1132(a)(1)(B), we apply a federal common law of contract, 
informed both by general principles of contract law and by ERISA's purposes as 
manifested in its specific provisions.”  Burstein v. Retirement Account Plan for 
Employees of Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation
Although there is no direct precedent that confirms ERISA must be considered in 
light of equitable realities, there are countless instances in which equity has been 
predominant in ERISA’s concerns. 
, 334 F.3d 365, 381 
(3d Cir. 2003) (Emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted, internal citations 
omitted). 
See, e.g., Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 
F.3s 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2004) (prejudgment interest on an ERISA award is governed in 
certain circumstances not by “a rigid theory of compensation for money withheld, but is 
given in response to considerations of fairness.  It is denied when its exaction would be 
inequitable.”)  (Quoting Board of Commissioners of Jackson County, Kansas v. United 
States
Dr. Fleisher’s situation is particularly problematic in light of the conflict under 
which the Standard administrator labors.  The conflict that 
, 308 U.S. 343, 352, (1939)).  (Italics added.) 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 
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(2008) have recognized where the benefit-giver and the administrator of the benefit are 
the same, is clearly patent on this appeal.  Standard profits by the deduction of $1500 per 
month from Dr. Fleisher’s benefits.  It does so by relying wholly upon an extraneous 
statement in the North American policy, which reads “[h]aving issued group policy 
PGA320, hereinafter called ‘policy.’”   
Standard, the District Court, and the majority here discredit North American’s 
own characterization of its own [North American] policy.  North American’s Assistant 
Vice President, Mr. Ken Selasky has clearly written and explained that “even though this 
[North American] policy was issued through this group [AAE], it is an individual income 
policy and we are treating all aspects of Dr. Fleisher’s claim as an individual disability 
income policy.” (Emphasis added).   
The District Court and the majority completely overlook the nature of the North 
American policy, to wit, that it was individually underwritten, non-cancellable, 
guaranteed renewable, that Dr. Fleisher paid his premiums and made claims directly to 
North American, that he enrolled for coverage directly with North American, and that he 
received an individual billing statement.  These are not traditional group policy 
characteristics.  These are the basic characteristics of an individual policy.   
Our Supreme Court has said that it is “more important (perhaps of great 
importance) where the circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that it affects the 
benefits decision . . . to take steps to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy.”  
Glenn, supra 554 U.S. at 117.  In other words, to properly consider the impact of conflict 
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of interest in determining the reasonableness of an administrator’s decision, a reviewing 
court must consider the closeness of the case and the severity of the conflict of interest.   
The District Court, in dismissing Dr. Fleisher’s complaint, did not undertake any 
factfinding or substantial discussion related to the administrator’s conflict of interest or 
its severity.  Although the District Court acknowledged that a conflict of interest did in 
fact exist, the order dismissing Fleisher’s complaint summarily concluded that “this is not 
so close a case that any conflict of interest would break the tie and tip the scales in favor 
of the plaintiff.”  Although my colleagues in the majority agree with the District Court, I 
cannot.  This case goes beyond the point of being close, to the point of the administrator’s 
decision being incorrect--if ever there were a situation where the administrator’s conflict 
of interest must properly be considered as a factor, this is it!   
 Indeed, it should be remembered that the District Court dismissed Dr. Fleisher’s 
complaint pursuant to F.R.A.P. Section 12(b)(6).  Such a dismissal requires that a Court 
accept the allegation of the complaint as true, and that it construe the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.   
 Dismissal with prejudice is a drastic sanction termed “extreme” by the Supreme 
Court in National Hockey League v. Met. Hockey Club. 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976), yet, 
here, the District Court did not only dismiss Dr. Fleisher’s complaint, with prejudice, but 
in doing so, it dealt with the merits of  his action. 
 If the hallmark of the District Court’s “arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review” is reasonableness, and if the relevant inquiry, as the majority of this Court states, 
“….is not whether it is reasonable to interpret the North America policy as an individual 
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policy, but whether it is unreasonable to interpret it as group insurance,” Maj. Op. at 20, 
then I suggest that we should look to other measures of dismissal for a balancing of what 
is or is not reasonable.   
 In Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), 
this Court, by Judge Sloviter, prescribed a test consisting of six (6) factors by which a 
dismissal with prejudice should be balanced and analyzed.1
 While the context of Poulis differs from Dr. Fleisher’s claims, it is quite evident 
that prejudice is one of the most significant factors in determining the appropriateness of 
dismissal.  And what could be more prejudicial or conflict-ridden than the actions of 
Standard in decreasing Dr. Fleisher’s benefits by $1500 a month while it continues to 
receive premiums based on $10,000 in coverage? 
  True, the Poulis case 
involved a sanction and did not arise under the ERISA statute, but it is instructive to 
recognize the length to which we have gone in preserving cases for a merits 
determination rather than dismissing them on a mere reading of the complaint.   
 I see no reason why the same sort of analysis should not be employed in an ERISA 
context where the reasonableness of a dismissal is at issue.  A balancing of prejudice and 
                                              
1 In Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984), 
we required the District Court to assess: 
 1. The extent of the parties responsibility; 
 2. prejudice to the adversary; 
 3. a history of dilatoriness; 
 4. whether the attorney’s conduct was willful or in bad faith; 
 5. alternative sanctions; and 
 6. the meritoriousness of the claim,  
cautioning that dismissal must be  a last resort. 
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a balancing of the factors that result in a dismissal would only improve the analysis of a 
Section 12(b)(6) dismissal under ERISA. 
 The majority has held that the District Court was not unreasonable to interpret the 
North America policy as a group insurance policy.  I, of course, disagree using the same 
loadstar of reasonableness as did the majority. 
 While I am loathe to discount all of the analyses found in the majority opinion, I 
cannot accept the fact that fair and equitable means should be so thoroughly disregarded 
in favor of fitting a legal square peg into a legal round hole.  To me, the majority has 
resolved Dr. Fleisher’s problem by merely seeking out some the legal principles which 
would support its conclusion without regard to the fundamental precepts of equity, 
fairness and justice2
 When I assemble these various concerns and concepts in this case, I realize that 
this entire area of equitable concern has not been addressed in any fashion by the 
majority.  I conclude that we should redeem this failing by remanding this appeal to the 
District Court for consideration of the various factors and particularly the equitable and 
fairness elements to which I have adverted.   
.  A major consideration on this appeal should include judicial insight 
to the nature of the problem, the nature of the conflict which the administrator of an 
ERISA plan must analyze, the nature of the ramifications that may ensue from this 
Court’s decision, and the nature of the actions that a litigant can take to protect a 
particularly vital interest. 
                                              
2 The goal to which we as judges are all wedded, in addition to the oath which we take, is 
found in Deuteronomy 16:20, “Justice, justice shalt thou pursue.”  
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 I, therefore, respectfully dissent. 
